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Abstract
This paper reexamines the relationship between the time prefer-
ence rate and the real interest rate in the neoclassical growth model by
introducing Keynesian time preference. It is shown that the long-run
behavior of the neoclassical growth model persists. When introduuc-
ing money by money-in-utility, money is superneutral and the optimal
monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Keywords: Keynesian time preference, Monetary Superneutrality,
Optimum Quantity of Money
JEL Classication Numbers: E31, E5, O41
1 Introduction
In Neoclassical economics the rate of time preference is usually taken as an
exogenous parameter in an individuals utility function which describes the
degree of patience and captures the tradeo¤between consumption today and
consumption in the future. In the continuous-time model, the larger the time
preference rate is, the larger proportion of their income are used in present
consumption by the people with less patience. And the interest rate is the
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rate of return of capital and other nancial assets, which is equal to the mar-
ginal product of capital at any point in time. In the long run steady state,
the subjective time preference rate determines and equals the objective real
interest rate. It is a mazing result with simplied assumptions. But in reality
there seemingly exist some aws. One of them is that the neoclassical model
assumes that the subjective time preference is a given constant. As a kind of
individual or social habits, time preference must uctuate with the evolution
of the economy and society. That is to say, the time preference rate must
be an (endogenous) variable in the model. The literature on endogenous
time preference rate extends the assumptions and results of the standard
neoclassical growth model, such as . The other aw is that the time prefer-
ence rate determines unilaterally the real rate of interest and correspondingly
capital accumulation and growth and the converse is impossible. Does the
real rate of interest a¤ects the degree of patience of the people? In his great
work, Keynes talks about the changes in the rate of time-discounting: it
was convenient to suppose that expenditure on consumption (auther: the
time discount rate) is cet. par. negatively sensitive to changes in the rate
of interest, so that any rise in the rate of interest would appreciably di-
minish consumption. It has long been recognised, however, that the total
e¤ect of changes in the rate of interest on the readiness to spend on present
consumption is complex and uncertain, being dependent on conicting ten-
dencies, since some of the subjective motives towards saving will be more
easily satised if the rate of interest rises, whilst others will be weakened.
Over a long period substantial changes in the rate of interest probably tend
to modiy social habits considerably, thus a¤ecting the subjective propersity
to spendthough in which direction it would be hard to say, except in the
light of actual experience.Perhaps the most important inuence, operat-
ing through changes in the rate of interest, on the readiness to spend out of
a given income, depends on the e¤ect of these changes on the appreciation
or depreciation in the price of securities and other assets.From the cited
passages, Keynes roughly points out that the time preference rate depends
upon the real interest rate endogenously in the long run, and the higher the
real interest rate, the stronger the desire for saving.
Though as a kind of social habits the time preference rate (or the degree
of patience) is relatively stable, it is intuitive to see the real interest rate will
a¤ect the consumption habit in the long run. In order to consider the e¤ect of
the real interest rate on the time preference rate, we impose some assumptions
on the time preference rate in the neoclassical growth model based on Keynes
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statements. By assuming the time preference rate is a strictly decreasing
and strictly convex function of the real interest rate, we nd that the long
run bahavior of the neoclassical growth model persists. Furthermore, in the
neoclassical monetary growth model, money is superneutral and the optimal
monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
2 Keynesian Time Preference
Based on the previous analysis, we assume that the time preference rate of
the representative agent is a strictly decreasing and stictly convex function
of the real interest rate, namely,
t = (rt); (2.1)
which satises
0(rt) < 0; 00(rt) > 0; (0) = f : (2.2)
Asumptions (2.1) and (2.2) make the time preference rate endogenous,
and they imply that the higher the real interest rate is, the more patient the
individual is. But notice that the increase in the patience is at a decreasing
rate. Moreover, the discount rate is a positive constant if the ination rate is
zero, just like a Fisherianconsumer with a constant rate of time preference,
i.e., (0) = f . Furthermore, it is also assumed that the time discount factor
of the individual at time t depends not only on the current level of ination,
but also on the entire path of past real interest rate frvgtv=0, namely,
t =
Z t
v=0
(rv)dv: (2.3)
Then the modelling strategy has generated a new state variable, the real
time discount factor t. Di¤erentiating t with respect to t in equation
(2.3), we obtain the dynamic accumulation equation of the time discount
factor, namely,
_t = (rt): (2.4)
With these new elements introduced, this paper will reexamine the neoclas-
sical growth model.1
1For simplicity, we just consider the case without population growth.
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3 The Neoclassical Growth Model
The representative individuals optimization problem is to maximizeZ 1
t=0
u(ct)e
 tdt (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint

kt = f(kt)  ct; (3.2)
the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t!1
kt exp( 
Z t
v=0
rvdv) = 0; (3.3)
and the initial value of the physical capital k0, where ct and kt are consump-
tion and physical capital stock respectively; rt and t are the real interest
rate and the time discount factor; u(ct) and f(kt) are the standard utility
function and neoclassical production function. And the no-Ponzi-game con-
dition rules out unlimited borrowings.
To proceed, the optimization problem of the representative consumer is to
maximize (3.1), subject to (3.2), (2.4) and (3.3). The Hamiltonian associated
with this problem is
H = u(ct)e
 t + t[f(kt)  ct] + t(rt);
where t and t are the multiplier associated with the constraints (6) and
(4), representing the shadow values of capital and time discount factor re-
spectively. The FOCs are as follows
u0(ct)e t = t; (3.4)
tf
0(kt) =  

t; (3.5)
e tu(ct) =

t: (3.6)
Substituting equation (3.4) and rt = f 0(kt) into (3.5) leads to

ct =   u
0(ct)
u00(ct)
[f 0(kt)  (f 0(kt))]: (3.7)
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Similiar to the standard neoclassical growth model, equations (3.2) and
(3.7) form the dynamic system that we concern together with the initial
condition k0 and the transversality condition. Dene the steady state (c; k)
by

ct =

kt = 0. We get a form of algebraic equations
f 0(k) = (f 0(k)); (3.8)
f(k) = c: (3.9)
From these assumptions on the time preference rate and the neoclassical
assumptions of the production function, there exits a unique k satisfying
equation (3.8) and correspondingly a unique c satisfying equation (3.9).
Linearizing equtions (3.2) and (3.7) results in the linearized system
 
c

k
!
=
 
0   u0(c)
u00(c)f
00
(k)(1  0(f 0(k))
 1 f 0(k)
!
c  c
k   k

: (3.10)
It is easy to nd the determinant of the Jacobian of the coe¢ cient matrix
is negative, i.e., J =   u0(c)
u00(c)f
00
(k)[1  0(f 0(k)) < 0, which tells that there
is a nagative eigenvalue and a positive eigenvalue. Hence, the steady state
of the linearized system is a saddle. As is hyperbolic, the linearized sys-
tem is conjugate to the original nonlinear system in a neighborhood of the
steady state similiar to the standard model. Therefore we have the following
propostion.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique steady state in the neoclassical growth
model with Keynesian time preference, which is a saddle, similiar to the
standard model with a constant time preference rate.
From equation (3.8) and r = f 0(k), we have r = (r). That is, in the
long run, the equilibrium interest rate equals the equilibrium time preference
rate and accurally the unique xed point of the time preference function. The
formular does embody not only the original idea that the time preference rate
determines the real interest rate, but also the idea of how the real interest
rate a¤ects the time preference.
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4 The Neoclassical Monetary Growth Model
In order to show the usefulness and comprehensiveness of the idea, we in-
troduce money into the model and reexamine the original model. Following
Sidrauski (1967), we use the assumption of money-in-utility in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework. The objective of the consumer is maximiz-
ing
W =
Z 1
t=0
e tu(ct;mt)dt; (4.1)
subject to the budeget constraint

at = rtkt + wt + xt   ct   tmt; (4.2)
wealth constraint
at = kt +mt; (4.3)
and the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t!1
at exp( 
Z t
v=0
rvdv) = 0; (4.4)
where ct ;mt; kt, and at are consumption, real money balances, physical cap-
ital stock, and total wealth, respectively; rt and wt are the real interest rate
and real wages; t and rt are the time discount factor and the real interest
rate; and xt denotes lump-sum real money transfer payments. The stock con-
straint requires that the total wealth at be allocated between capital kt and
real balances mt. And the no-Ponzi-game condition rules out unlimited bor-
rowings. The instantaneous utility function Ut = u(ct;mt) is assumed to be
well-behaved, satisfying uc > 0; um > 0; ucc < 0; umm < 0; uccumm u2cm > 0
and the Inada conditions. Following Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), Shi
(2001), and Miao (2004), we assume that both commodities are not infe-
rior2. Furthermore, to reach a denitive conclusion, following Calvo (1979),
Wang and Zou (2011), we assume that consumption and real money bal-
ances are Edgeworth-complementary, i.e., ucm > 0:3Intuitively, an increase
2It is not hard to prove that the normality of the two goods is equivalent to the following
two conditions, respectively, umm   ucmumuc < 0; uccumuc   ucm < 0.
3Wang & Chong (1992) Aiyagariv & McGrattan (2003), and Barro (2003) called the
assumption pareto complementarity between consumption and money.
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in real balances raises the marginal valuation of consumption and increases
consumption; and a lower level of money holdings decreases the marginal val-
uation of consumption and lowers consumption. Hence, in the steady state,
consumption and real money balances move in the same direction.
To proceed, the optimization problem of the representative consumer is
to maximize (4.1), subject to (4.2), (2.4), (4.3) and (4.4). The Hamiltonian
associated with this problem is
H = u(ct;mt)e
 t +t[rtkt +wt  ct tmt +  t] +t(rt) + qt(kt +mt  at);
(4.5)
where t and t are the multiplier associated with the constraints (4.2) and
(2.4), representing the shadow values of wealth and time discount factor,
respectively; qt is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the stock constraint
(4.3), representing the marginal value of total wealth.4
The rst-order conditions for a maximum are given by equations (10)-(13)
together with the transversality conditions:
uc(c;m)e
  = ; (4.6)
um(c;m)e
  = (r + ); (4.7)

+ r = 0; (4.8)
u(c;m)e  =

; (4.9)
lim
t!1
e k = 0; lim
t!1
e  = 0: (4.10)
The behavior of the rm is simple. Competitive pricing gives
r = f 0(k); w = f(k)  kf 0(k): (4.11)
In order to examine macroeconomic equilibrium, we introduce the gov-
ernments behavior. It is assumed that the government maintains a constant
rate of monetary growth
4For notional simplicity, we will omit the time subscript in the following mathematical
presentations.
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_M
M
= ; (4.12)
and keeps its budget balanced
x =
_M
P
; (4.13)
where  and g are two constants denoting the monetary growth rate and gov-
ernment expenditure, respectively. By the denition of real money balances,
m = M
P
. Substituting equation (4.12) into equation (4.13) results in x = m.
We impose the assumption of perfect foresight which says that the expected
rate of ination is equal to the real rate of ination, namely,
_P
P
= : (4.14)
Taking the derivative of m = M
P
with respect to t, rearranging, and substi-
tuting equtions (4.12) and (4.14) into it, we have
_m = (   )m: (4.15)
Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.11) imply that:
um(c;m)
uc(c;m)
= (f 0(k) + ): (4.16)
From equation (4.16), we solve  as a function of c;m;and k, i.e., t =
(c; k;m). And it is easy to show that
c =
umcuc   uccum
u2c
> 0; m =
ummuc   ucmum
u2c
< 0; k =  f 00(k) > 0:
(4.17)
Putting t = (c; k;m) into equation (4.15) gives the dynamics of real money
balances
_m = (   (c; k;m))m: (4.18)
Equation (4.6), (4.8), (4.11) and (4.18) give rise to
_c =   uc(c;m)
ucc(c;m)
[f 0(k)  (f 0(k))]  ucm(c;m)
ucc(c;m)
(   (c; k;m))m: (4.19)
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From equation (4.2), (4.3) and (4.15), we have
_k = f(k)  c: (4.20)
Therefore, equations (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20) describe the whole dynamics
of the model.
In order to examine the three-dimension dynamic system, we would nd
the steady state (c; k;m) by dening _c = _k = _m = 0. The resulting form
of algebraic equations is
f 0(k) = (f 0(k)); (4.21)
f(k) = c; (4.22)
 = (c; k;m): (4.23)
Equation (4.21) gives the familiar modied golden-rule level of capital
accumulation, which shows that, in the steady state, the marginal product of
physical capital equals the subjective time preference rate; equation (34) tells
that the steady-state production equals the steady-state level of consumption;
and equation (4.23) shows that the steady-state level of ination is equal to
the exogenous level of monetary growth.
Similiar to equation (3.8), equation (4.21) determines uniquely the steady
state level of capital and real interest rate r: Then equation (4.22) gives the
steady state level of consumption and equation (4.23) determines the steady
state level of real money balances implicitly. To examine the stibility of the
steady state, we linearize equations (4.18)-(4.20) around the steady state
(c; k;m)
24 _c_k
_m
35 =
24 ucmucc cm   ucuccf 00(1  0) + ucmucc km ucmucc mm 1 f 0(k) 0
 cm  km  mm
3524 c  ck   k
m m
35 :
(4.24)
Let us dene the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system as J . It is not
hard to nd that
3Y
i=1
i = det(J) =
uc
ucc
f 00(k)mm
(1  0(f 0(k))) < 0; (4.25)
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and
3X
i=1
i = tr(J) = f
0(k) +
(uccu

mm   u2mc)
 ucucc
> 0: (4.26)
Equation (4.25) implies that there exists one negative real eigenvalue or three
eigenvalues with negative real parts, and equation (4.26) tells that there
exists one eigenvalue with a positive real part at least. Hence there exists an
eigenvalue with a negative real part exactly and the steady state is a saddle.
Proposition 2 In the Sidrauski model with Keynesian time preference, the
steady state exists uniquelly and is locally saddle-point stable.
Totally di¤erentiating equations (33)-(35) gives us a three-dimensional
linear system as follows:
24 0 (1  0(f 0(k)))f 00(k) 01  f 0(k) 0
c 

k 

m
3524 dcddk
d
dm
d
35 =
24 00
1
35 : (4.27)
Applying Cramers rule results in
dc
d
= 0; (4.28)
dk
d
= 0; (4.29)
dm
d
=
1
m
< 0: (4.30)
Equations (4.28) and (4.29) shows that monetary superneutrality guarantees
in the Sidrauski model with Keynesian time preference, i.e., a permanent
change in the monetary growth rate has no e¤ect on the steady state level of
consumption and capital.
To examine the optimality of Friedmans rule for optimum quantity of
money, let us write down the steady-state utility:
W  =
Z 1
t=0
e (r
)tu(c;m)dt =
u(c;m)
(r)
: (4.31)
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Taking the derivative of W  with respect to  in equation (44) yields
dW 
d
=
(uc
dc
d
+ um
dm
d
)r + uf 00(k)dk

d
r2
=
um
mr
: (4.32)
Setting dW

d
= u

m
mr
= 0 and reminding equations (4.16) and (4.21) give
rise to
 =  (r) =  r: (4.33)
Equation (4.33) gives the standard result of Friedmans rule for optimum
quantity of money, i.e., the optimal monetary growth rate is equal to the
negative of the time preference rate. Di¤erent from the literature, the time
preference rate in our model is endogenously determined by the real interest
rate. For the time preference function, the long run real interest rate is a
xed point by equation (4.33). Hence, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the Sidrauski model with Keynesian time preference, money
is superneutral and optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
5 Summary
In this short paper, by introducing the ination rate into the representative
agents time preference rate, we have reexamined the e¤ects of monetary and
scal policies in the money-in-utility model. The comparative static analysis
has demonstrated: neither monetary superneutrality nor Friedmans rule
for optimum quantity of money holds. Specically, with an increase of the
money growth rate, the steady-state consumption, physical capital stock,
real money balance holdings, and welfare all decrease. In addition, with a
rise in government expenditure, the steady-state consumption, real money
balances, and welfare will be reduced, whereas the steady-state capital stock
remains unchanged.
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